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A DECLARATION
OF DEPENDENCE

FOR IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMITTEES
By Makela Hayford
What does independent mean to you? In Bribriesco-Ledger v. Klipsch, Iowa’s Supreme Court gave a surprising answer
to Iowa’s city civil rights commissions. Where one may be inclined to see independent commissions as insulated
from both the political process and elected officials in turn, the Court saw independence as window-dressing. In
overturning the trial court, Iowa’s highest court declared that civil rights commissioners are removable by the elected
officials they are supposed to hold accountable.
In this case, the mayor of Davenport, Iowa, fired Nicole BribriescoLedger and three other commissioners shortly after learning that
those commissioners discussed taking legal action against the
city. Bribriesco-Ledger asserted that members of a city’s civil rights
commission could only be fired for cause, while the mayor claimed
the commissioners served at the leisure of the executive and could be
terminated at-will. The trial court agreed with Bribriesco-Ledger, as it
was persuaded that part of what makes a commission “independent”
is the members’ employee status. The lower court held that the mayor,
Frank Klipsch, only had the authority to remove committee members
for cause. Therefore, because Bribriesco-Ledger was not fired for cause,
her removal was unlawful.
On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reduced the fact pattern above to
this sentence: “This appeal requires us to answer whether Davenport’s
mayor may remove an appointee from the Davenport Civil Rights
Commission without cause.” Immediately, the omission of relevant
facts raises concerns about the Court’s intent. The facts of this case
are egregious, and they illustrate the type of situation from which an
“independent” committee should be exempt. The Court spent no time
on these facts, the implications of these facts or the way in which the
law would be expected to interact with these facts. Ignoring the facts
of a case is a poor way to deal with any ambiguity that arises in that
case, as it allows a court to analyze the law in isolation, narrowing or
broadening the scope of the words to achieve a desired outcome.
In reversing the trial court, the Iowa Supreme Court claimed that
its interpretation of the law was the truest to the text of the 1990
Iowa Acts law. That law created civil rights committees in each city
with a population over 29,000. Notably, the Court repeatedly cited
former Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s book, Reading Law, in
conjunction with case law from the early 20th century as it declined
to apply the first definition of “independent agency” from Black’s Law
Dictionary, a frequently updated publication of the 21st century. The
Court finds this definition to be too broad for the purposes of this law.

Truth to the letter of the law is one matter, but truth to the spirit of
the law is another. The Court asserted that the letter of Iowa law
properly reflected the intended interaction of municipal law and civil
rights commissions. The majority omitted almost any evaluation
of supporting case law for her position, from Iowa or elsewhere.
The closest the Court came to analyzing the merits of BribriescoLedger’s argument is to dismiss her assertion that members of
“independent” committees may only be removed for cause. The Court
employed whataboutism, citing the Iowa Code’s provision that the
independent commission has control over staff. The Court claimed
no commission would have to specify this control if that commission
was independent in the manner Bribriesco-Ledger asserted, so
“independent” must not mean what Bribriesco-Ledger asserted.
The Court applied a maxim of textual interpretation: inclusion of one
term is an exclusion of all others. This is a maxim generally applied
to lists, but here the Court applied it to portray a clarification as a
contradiction.
Problematically, the Court neglected to mention that the mayor
basically fired these members to preempt legal action. The Supreme
Court ripped all context from this decision and insulated the law from
the facts, then gave the law a brittle, textual skin. Proponents of this
type of interpretation claim it is a principled approach to give certainty
to legal outcomes. Here, the Court offers the panacea of more certain
outcomes at the cost of context, willfully ignoring the negative
externalities—chiefly the municipal authority being unaccountable
to civil rights committee actions—caused by its decision. “The law is
what it says,” and one needs to look no further at the ramifications.
Those ramifications of the Court’s decision will be felt most by citizens
of Iowa’s larger communities who cannot afford legal representation.
Iowans who can afford representation can sue the city directly for civil
rights violations, but this decision renders the civil rights committee
toothless by de facto removing the commission’s power to bring a
lawsuit. As with the facts in this case, all a mayor or similar municipal
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authority must do is fire the members of the
civil rights committee that are planning to sue.
They can then replace appointees at will, likely
under the condition they do not pursue legal
action against the city. If the new appointee
defects, the municipal authority fires him or
her, and the cycle begins anew. Ultimately,
this power grants municipalities immunity
from these civil rights committees. This is the
context that the Bribriesco-Ledger court failed
to consider in the majority opinion.
Judge Appel captured the urgency of this
matter in his Bribriesco-Ledger dissent. His
dissent contained the only full recounting
of the facts from the trial court. He noted
the dissociation of “independent” from its
understood legal meaning by his colleagues
and explained why their reasoning did not
square with the history, intent or language of
the statute the majority analyzed.
Judge Appel’s deep dive into the history
of Iowa civil rights legislation is both
illuminating for the reader and embarrassing
for the majority. Where the majority applied
a selective sort of textual argument, picking
and choosing which statutes to analyze in
concert with less frequently used definitions
of “independent,” Judge Appel wrote a
dissertation. He expertly cut through the
veil of textualism to the matter at hand:
These civil rights committees cannot
function in claims against their own city if
their members can be fired at will by the
city’s elected officials. The mayor’s firings in
anticipation of litigation were flagrant, and
Judge Appel refused to allow his conduct to
be cloaked as a mere “firing without cause” to
an uninitiated reader.
Judge Appel noted that Bribriesco-Ledger
is just one step further down the road for
the court regarding municipal authority over
“independent” committees. He cited multiple
recent decisions showcasing this erosion, and
the repercussions are summarized succinctly
in his conclusion:
After today, unless there is a provision in the
local ordinance protecting the “independence”
of the commission,1 a sincere local commission
might consider disclosing to citizens in a
candid brochure or other publication that it
only has the resources to bring a handful
of cases, that a [right-to-sue] letter is not
available for violations of the local ordinance
and that if the commission is considering
bringing an action against the city itself, or

another politically connected entity, the mayor
can fire the commissioners to stop it.2
Judge Appel dodged at least one inconvenient
decision in Seila Law LLC, however: In that
case, the Supreme Court ruled that the
president has the authority to remove the
head of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”), an “independent” agency,
because the agency was led by one director
instead of multiple commissioners. The
Court claimed this organizational structure
was incongruous with the Constitution
and permitted the CFPB’s head to be fired.
Seila Law was decided in 2020, so this case
is representative of the Court’s current
disposition on independent agencies.
While Judge Appel correctly noted that Seila
Law did not overturn Humphrey’s Executor,
the first Supreme Court case to recognize
that heads of independent agencies can
only be fired for cause, Seila Law limited
the scope of protection for independent
agencies. He also noted that Morrison, which
held that “inferior executive agents” without
rule making authority can be terminated on
a for-cause basis, is closer to BribriescoLedger’s position than the single director
of the CFPB in Seila Law. Despite these
caveats, Seila Law has undoubtedly eroded
some long-standing federal precedents of
independent agencies, and the Supreme
Court may be amenable to further erosion
when the opportunity presents itself.3 At
least Justices Thomas and Gorsuch were
prepared to overturn Humphrey’s Executor in
Seila Law, and while it is unknown if Justice
Coney Barrett would side with them, there
is at least a pathway to a total overturn
of Humphrey’s Executor, eliminating the
concept of independent agencies in Federal
After today, unless there is a provision
in the local ordinance protecting the
“independence” of the commission,1 a
sincere local commission might consider
disclosing to citizens in a candid
brochure or other publication that it only
has the resources to bring a handful
of cases, that a [right-to-sue] letter is
not available for violations of the local
ordinance and that if the commission is
considering bringing an action against
the city itself, or another politically
connected entity, the mayor can fire the

law. Thus, the Iowa Supreme Court’s majority
opinion in Bribriesco-Ledger reflects the
trend in federal law, and it is not a trend that
favors Judge Appel’s dissent, no matter how
well-reasoned, precise, and rooted in fact and
precedent it is.
These trends away from independent
commissions in Iowa and elsewhere will
lead to more legal challenges for existing
commissions, agencies, and otherwise. As
seen here, an official like Mayor Klipsch may
act egregiously in the face of legal action
from an independent commission, and now
there is no recourse for that official in the
legal system. Sure, that official probably loses
re-election. So what? The next person in the
role will have the same free reign to avoid
consequences as the last one.
In conclusion, independent agencies are
viewed as blasphemy to constitutional
originalists who see these agencies as an
illegitimate fourth branch of government.
This theory has become more popular in
recent years, and it is all too easily expanded
to municipalities. Municipal agents wield
similar power to other executives over
a smaller jurisdiction, enabling them to
act swiftly and respond to the citizenry.
Allowing mayors or similar units of municipal
government to oust the commission
preparing to sue them is a declaration of
dependence, and that voice joins the growing
chorus. States will see their independent
agencies challenged in conjunction with
the national trend, and these agencies
will continue to be bent by jurists who
see them as illegitimate until they finally
break. That break must be done through
individual challenges in each state, but a
formal overturning of Humphrey’s Executor
may open the floodgates. For those who
have pushed to see these agencies brought
back under the clear control of the executive
branch, Iowa’s decision in Bribriesco-Ledger
is a sweet victory. For those who may face
discrimination in the future and find their
complaints go unanswered by an agency that
is no longer able to help them find justice,
this so-called victory is unpalatable.
1.	Bribriesco-Ledger v. Klipsch, 957 N.W.2d 646
(Iowa 2021).
2.	Bribriesco-Ledger v. Klipsch, 957 N.W.2d 646,
668-69 (Iowa 2021).
3.	Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211
(2020) (Thomas, J. and Gorsuch, J. Concurring in
Part and Dissenting in Part).
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